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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AMERICAN COAL CO.,
EMERY MINING CORP.,
and STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiff/appellant,

vs.

Case No. 19134

TERRY W. SANDSTRIM,
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, and SECOND INJURY FUND,
Defendant/respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
SECOND INJURY FUND

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a writ of review from an order of the Industrial
Commission.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The defendant Second Injury Fund concurs in the
statement of the disposition by the Industrial Commission
contained in the briefs of the plaintiffs and the defendant
Industrial Commission.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant Second Injury Fund respectfully
requests that this court affirm the order of the Industrial
Commission.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant Second Injury Fund concurs in the
statement of facts contained in the briefs of the plaintiffs
and the defendant Industrial Commission.

This defendant

notes additionally that it has paid to the defendant Sandstrom
the permanent partial disability benefits for which the
Industrial Commission held it liable.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
The issue on appeal is whether the State Insurance
Fund is entitled to reimbursement from the Second Injury
Fund for medical expenses and temporary disability benefits
paid by the State Insurance Fund to the applicant during his
initial period of temporary disability.
ARGUMENT
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION CORRECTLY
APPLIED THE RECENTLY AMENDED PROVISIONS
OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §35-1-69 TO HOLD
THE PLAINTIFFS LIABLE FOR COMPENSATION
AND MEDICAL EXPENSES PAYABLE TO THE
APPLICANT UP TO THE DATE OF HIS STABALI ZATION
The Industrial Commission has ruled that since the
applicant's cause of action arose after the effective date of
recent amendments of Utah Code Anno .. §35-1-69, payment of his
temporary total disability benefits and medical expenses up
to date of his stablization is the exclusive responsibility of
the employer and its carrier.

The Commission concluded that

the Second Injury Fund is not liable for a portion of

payments as it might have been before the statute was amended.
The plantiffs contend the amendment did not change the rights
of an employer to reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund.
At issue is the correct construction of the following paragraph
added to §35-1-69 as part of the several amendments by the
Legislature in 1981:

(A copy of the entire provision is

included as Appendix "A").
Where the payment of temporary total
disability benefits, medical expenses, or
other related items are required as a
result of the industrial injury subject
to this section, the employer or its
insurance carrier shall be responsible
for all such temporary benefits, medical
care, or other related items up to the
end of the period of temporary total
disability resulting from the industrial
injury.
Any allocation of disability
benefits, medical care, or other related
items following such period shall be made
between the employer or its insurer
and the second injury fund as provided
for herein, and any payments made by the
employer or its insurance carrier in
excess of its proportionate share shall
be recoverable at the time of the
award for combined disabilities if
any is made hereunder.
As noted previously, the plaintiff State Insurance
Fund and the defendant Second Injury Fund stipulated before
the Commission that the applicant had a 20% permanent partial
disability of the back, 10% of which was caused by an industrial
injury of November 23, 1981 and 10% of which was due to preexisting conditions.

(R.195,212).

partial disability

have been paid.
-3-

Benefits for his permanent
The applicant incurred

medical expenses and was totally disabled for a period of time
after the accident.

Though the record does not reflect the

period of his temporary total disability, the State Insurance
Fund paid all amounts owing during this period and submitted to
the Industrial Commission the question whether the Second Injury
Fund should reimburse it for 50% of these expenses.

(R.194,197).

The Industrial Commission interpreted the amended
portion of Section 69 cited above to mean that during a period
of temporary total disability which follows an industrial
accident that has aggravated a pre-existing condition, the
employer is liable for the full amount of temporary total disability
and medical expenses up to the end of that period,even if the
applicant's permanent partial disability is in part attributable
to pre-existing conditions.

The Commission ruled that after

this period ends, his benefits are subject to apportionment

between those parties and entered its order based

upon this construction of the statute.

(R.213,216).

The question raised by the plaintiffs about the proper
application of the amended provision of Utah Code Anno. §35-1-69
is one of first impression.

This Court should affirm the order

of the Industrial Commission because its construction of the
statute is clearly correct in view of the obvious meaning of
the language used and the purpose of the Legislature in
emending the statute.
The plaintiffs correctly note in their brief that
prior to enactment of the 1981 amendments, this Court construed
-4-

Section 69 of the Workers Compensation Act to mean that whenever a worker sustained a permanent disability as a result of
an industrial accident that was substantially greater because
it combined with a pre-existing disability, the Second Injury
Fund was liable for a proportionate share of temporary total
disability compensation and medical expenses as well as
permanent disability benefits.

This construction was first

announced in the case of Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v.
Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah 1977) and continued to be applied
in later cases, i.e. Intermountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano,
610 P.2d 334

(Utah 1980).

The plaintiffs incorrectly assert, however, that the
cases of Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital, 656 P.2d 430 (Utah 1982)
and U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 657
P.2d 764 (Utah 1983) are cases arising under the amended statutes
which demonstrate that this Court construes the amendment to
have made no change in the law.

Though these cases were

decided after the 1981 amendments were enacted, they arose out
of industrial accidents which occurred before the amendments; the
Paoli accident in 1979, Paoli v. Cottonwood Hospital, supra,
656 P.2d at 420; and the most recent of Anderton's accidents
in the U.S. Fid. & Guar. case was in July, 1975, U.S. Fed.
Guar. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, supra, 657 P.2d at
764.

In neither case did the Court apply or construe the

amendment whose meaning is disputed in this case.

-5-

This court has held that its fundamental responsibility
when interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of
the Legislature, Johnson v. State Tax Commission, 17 Utah
2d 337, 411 P.2d 831

(1966).

The first step in statutory

construction is to examine the plain and ordinary meaning
of the language employed to determine whether the intention
of the Legislature is apparant, Grant v. Utah State Land Board,
26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035

(1971};

Spangenberg v.

Cheney School Dist., No. 30, 97 Wash. 2d 118, 641 P.2d 163
( 198 3) .
'lhe defendant Second Injury Fund contends that in
this instance the intention of the Legislature is apparant
from the clear meaning of the language used.

With reference

to medical expenses and temporary disability benefits the
statute provides that,
. the employer or its insurance
carrier shall be responsible for all
such temporary benefits, medical care,
or other related items up to the end
of the period of temporary total
disability resulting from the injury.
With reference to obligations arising after the initial period,
it provides that

Any allocation of disability benefits,
medical care, or other related items
following such period shall be made
between the employer or its insurer
and the second injury fund provided for
herein . . •
The plaintiff state Insurance Fund argues that since the
Legislature provided that employers would be "responsible" for

-6-

Erz

temporary benefits, it did not mean to make thl'm "liaule" for
temporary benefits.

It contends that even though the statute

refers to allocations of benefits "following'' the initial
period of temporary disability, the Legislature really intended
to allocate benefits which arise during the initial period,
exactly as it had been done before the amendment, without
substantive change in the relative liabilities of employers
and the Second Injury Fund.
The word "responsible" is defined at p.1476 in Black's
Law Dictionary,

(Revised 4th Ed., 1968) as follows:

"Liable, legally accountable, or
answerable."
In accordance is Webster's Third New International Dictionary
(1966), p.1935 which lists "liable" as a synonym of "responsible".
The State Insurance Fund advocates a construction of the
statute which is inconsistent with it's plain meaning.

Giving

the words used their ordinary effect, it is apparant that the
Legislature intended to distinguish between temporary benefits
accruing before the initial period of temporary disability
ends and other benefits which may accrue later.

The first

category of benefits is one for which the employer and its
carrier are soley liable and the second category is one which
is to be apportioned with the Second Injury Fund if the other
requirements of Section 69 are satisfied.
Even if this statute is regarded as ambiguous, the
rules of construction which must then be applied resolve the
ambiguity in the defendant's favor.
-7-

One presumption which

arises in construing an amendment to a statute is that the
Legislature was aware of the construction given to a statute

uy the Supreme Court
l'aj'SOn City,

before it was amended, Greenhalgh v.

530 P.2d 799

(Utah 1975); Lekan v. P&L Fire

Protection Co., 609 P.2d 1289 (Okl. 1980);
95 Wash. 2d 257, 623 P.2d 683 (1980).

Woodson v. State,

A second presumption

is that when a statute is amended, the Legislature is presumed
to intend a change in the law by

Lincoln County

v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 102 Idaho 489, 632
P.2d 678

(1981);

990 (1980).

State v. Turpin, 94 Wash. 2d 820, 620 P.2d

The State Insurance Fund contends that the Leg-

islature did not intend to change the liability of the Second
Injury Fund for temporary benefits whereas the plain language
used as well as the presumption which applies strongly suggest
the contrary.
Another common rule of construction is that courts
should construe a statute so that it's effect is sensible and in
keeping with the purpose of the statute.
Ctah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846

Young v. Barney, 20

(1967), Andrus v. Allred, 17 Utah

2d 106, 404 P.2d 972 (1965).

In a real sense, the need for

medical treatment and the initial period of disability
from work arise because a worker is injured and not because
he had a pre-existing condition which until the accident had
not prevented him from working.

It is consistent with

the purpose of Section 69 and the Worker's Compensation Act
-8-

as a whole to make these immediate post-injury expenses the
exclusive responsibility of the employer and his carrier and
to limit the liability of the Second Injury Fund to permanent
disability benefits attributable to pre-existing conditions
and to medical expenses and total disability benefits which arise
after the effects of the accident itself have resolved.
When application of the rules of construction does not
completely resolve a dispute about the meaning of a statute,
courts are entitled to examine the legislative history
enactment in question.

of the

Parker v. Rampton, 28 Utah 2d 36,

497 P.2d 848 (1972);

State v. Winkle, 528 P.2d 467

(Utah 1974)

reh.den 535 P.2d 82.

More specifically, this Court may take

judicial notice of legislative proceedings, including discussions
and debates about the meaning of proposed legislation by members
of the Legislature prior to its enactment, whether reflected
in a legislative journal or by an official transcript.
ex rel. Blankenship v. Freeman, 440 P.2d 744

State

(Okl. 1968);

Industrial Commission v. Milka, 159 Colo. 114, 410 P.2d 181
(1966);

Knight v. Employment Security Agency, 88 Idaho 262,

398 P.2d 643 (1965).
Included as Appendix B to this brief is a copy of an
official transcript of the proceedings in the Utah State Senate
of March 5, 1981 relating to S.B. 187

which contained the 1981

amendments to Utah Code Anno. §35-1-69.

Senator K.S. Cornaby,

Majority Leader and sponsor of the bill, introduced it to the
Senate with an explanation that he was a member of the Industrial
-9-

Commission Advisory Board which had drafted the legislation.
With reference to its purpose he said,
The Bill before you, Senate Bill 187
is a bill which comes out of that
'
Advisory Committee to take care of
three or four items. One is a number
of housekeeping items, two is to
address a couple of issues which have
arisen concerning the Second Injury
Fund, and to more equitably allocate
the compensation for workmen's
injuries between the Fund and the
insurance companies.
(emphasis supplied)
Transcript of Senate proceedings, page 2,

(Appendix B).

Following

this explanation, the bill was adopted without amendment or
negative vote.
Senator Cornaby's remarks remove any doubt about the
purpose of the amended provision.

The Legislature intended

to change the relative liability of the Second Injury Fund and
workmen's compensation carriers and to accomplish a "more
equitable allocation of compensation" between them.

The more

equitable allocation was accomplished by the elimination of
the Second Injury Fund's liability for temporary benefits.
The Ortega case, supra, and its progeny

resulted in

a huge increase in claims filed against the Second Injury Fund
and particularly in payments made to carriers for temporary
total disability compensation and medical expenses.

In the

Capitano case, supra, 610 P.2d at 337, this Court noted the
µrevailing view of members of the Industrial Commission and their
iepresentatives that the effect of the Ortega decision was unfair to
-10-

the Second Injury Fund and advised those pcrsoi1s to address
their concerns to the legislature "whose function and perogative it is to make changes or clarifications with law".

The

State Insurance Fund may dispute the wisdom of the Legislature's
decision to adjust the balance between the Second Injury Fund
and the workmen's compensation insurance carriers, but there
can be no serious doubt that it intended to do so.
Finally, it should also be noted that the Industrial
Commission, as the agency which is charged by law with the
administration of the Worker's Compensation Act, is entitled
to have its administrative construction of a statutory provision
given weight by this Court.

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson,

30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217

(1973).

The Second Injury Fund respectfully submits that the
Industrial Commission correctly construed and applied the law
to the facts of this case.

Its construction of a recent amend-

ment to Utah Code Anno. §35-1-69 is consistent with its plain
meaning, the purpose of the Act, and the legislative history
of the amendment.

The Industrial Commission's decision on

inistrator,
-11-
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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APPENDIX A

35-1-69. Combined injuries resulting in permanent
incapacity - Payment out of second injury fund - Training of
employee.
(1)
If any employee who has previously incurred
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury, disease, or
congenital causes, sustaines an industrial injury for which
either compensation ene or medical care, or both, is provided by this title that results in permanent incapacity
which is substantially greater than he would have incurred
if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, or which
aggravates or is aggravated !2..z such pre-existing-incapacity,
compensation ene, medical care, wfiiefi-meeieai-eere and other
related items ere as outlined in section 35-1-81, shall be
awarded on the basis of the combined injuries, but the
liability of the employer for such compensation ene medical
care, and other related items shall be for the industrial
injury""Only and the remainder shall be paid out of the
second injury fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1)
referree
es
nsreeiei-fMnen.
For purposes of this section, (a)
aggravation of
pre-existing injury, disease or congenital cause shall be
deemed "substantially greater", and compensation, medical
care, and other related items shall be awarded on the basis
of theCombinea injuries as prOVIded above,
--however, that l£l where there is no such aggravation, no
award for combined injuries shall be made unless the percentage
of permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial
injury is lQ! or greater and the percentage of permanent
physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions,
including the industrial injury, is greater than
Where the pre-existing incapacity referred to in subsection <ll
J!2l of this section previously has been compensated for,
in whole or in part, as
permanent partial disability under
this act or the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law,
such compensation shall be deducted from the liability
assessed to the second injury fund under this paragraph.
Where the payment of temporary disability benefits,
medical expenses, or other related items are reguired as
result of the industrial injury subject to this section,
the employer or its insurance carrier shall be responsible
for all such temporary benefits, medical care, or other
related items E..12 to the end of the period of temporary
total disability resulting from the industrial injury.
allocation of disability benefits, medical
or
other related items following such period shall be made

.tM employer QL i l l insurer and the second injury fund
as provided for herein, and fil:lY payments made Qv: the employer
or its insurance carrier in
ii§_ proportionate
share shall be recoverable at the time of the award for
cc;n;bined disabilities if
made
A medical panel having the qualifications of the medical
panel set forth in section 35-2-56, shall review all medical
aspects of the case and determine first, the total permanent
physical impairment resulting from all causes and conditions
including the industrial injury; second, the percentage of
permanent physical impairment attributable to the industrial
injury; and third, the percentage of permanent physical
impairment attributable to the previously existing condition or
conditions, whether due to accidental injury, disease or
congenital causes.
The industrial commission shall then
assess the liability for permanent partial disability
compensation and future medical care to the employer on
the basis of the percentage of permanent physical impairment
attributable to the industrial injury only and
refflai"eer
amounts remaining to be paid hereunder shall be payable out of the saie
second injury fund; provided,
however, that medical expenses shall be paid in the first
instance .J2y the employer of its insurance carrier. Amounts,
if any, which have been paid by the employer in excess
of the portion attributable to the said industrial injury
shall be reimbursed to the employer out of saie
the second injury fund upon written request and verification
of amounts so expended.
(2)
In addition the commission in its discretion may
increase the weekly compensation rates to be paid out of
such special fund, such increase to be used for the
rehabilitation and training of any employee coming within
the provisions of this chapter as may be certified to
the commission by the rehabilitation department of the
state board of education as being eligible for rehabilitation
and training; provided, however, that in no
there be paid out of such special fund for rehabilitation
an amount in excess of $1,000.

APPENDIX B
S.B. No. 187, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION MODIFICATIONS
Sponsors:

K.S. Cornaby, Fred Finlinson and Arthur Kimball

1981 GENERAL SESSION, FORTY-FOURTH LEGISLATURE

VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

We hereby certify that the following transcript is a verbatim
and accurate reflection of the discussion regarding S.B. No. 187,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION MODIFICATIONS, occurring in the Senate
Chamber, March 5, 1981 (Day 53), and as recorded on Senate Recording
Disc. No. 247.

Sophia C. Buckmiller
Secretary of the Senate

Joan B. Thomas
Minute Clerk, Utah State Senate
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TRANSCRIPT OF SE!IATE FLOOR DEBATE ON

2

SENATE BILL (SB 187)

3

4

5
6

SPONSORED BY:

Senator K. S.
Senator Fred Finlinson, and
Senator Arthur Kimball.

DATE OF DEBATE:

Karch 5, 1981.

7

SECRETARY OF SENATE:

8

modifications by Senator

9

Labor and Economic Development to which was referred Senate Bill 187,

Bill number 187, Worlanen's Compensation
the report Kr. President.

Business,

10

Worlanen's Compensation modifications by Senator

and others has

11

carefully considered this bill, reports it out of Convnittee with a

12

favorable reconvnendation.
Respectfully,

13

14

Christensen
Convnittee Chairman

15

16
17

18

19
20

21
22
23
24

25

SENATOR CHRISTENSEN:

Kr. President, I move we adopt the

Convnittee report.
PRESIDENT FERRY:

Motion to adopt the Convnittee report.

Discussion, all in favor of the motion say "aye".
CHAMBER:

Aye.

PRESIDENT FERRY:
CHAMBER:

Opposed "no".

lllo.

PRESIDENT FERRY:

Motion carries.

Senator

1

DOCKET CLERK:

2

SENATOR CORNABY:

About thirty-five.

Thirty-five.

The bill before us Kr. President, ... I have

3

the privilege of serving as an exofficio member of the Advisory Council

4

for the Industrial Commission, and part of the work of that Advisory

5

Council which is comprised of both labor and management representatives

6

is to determine needed changes and modifications in the Workmen's

7

Compensation Act.

8

comes out of that Advisory Committee to take care of three or four

9

items.

The Bill before you, Senate Bill 187 is a bill which

One is a number of housekeeping items, two is to address a couple

10

of issues which have arisen concerning the Second Injury Fund, and to

11

more equitably allocate the compensation for workmen's injuries between

12

the Fund and the insurance companies.

13

I think it is fairly straight forward.

14

would be glad to try to respond to them, if not I'd call for the

15

question.

16

PRESIDENT FERRY:

17

SENATOR MATHESON:

18

19
20

21
22
23

24
25

It's a fairly technical item, but
If there are any questions, I

Matheson.
Excuse me, does this change in the bill in

any way change the payment structure to individuals?
SENATOR CORNABY:

Would you repeat that question?

SENATOR MATHESON:

Does the provision of this bill change the

payment structure to individuals under the compensation in any way?
SENATOR CORNABY:

No.

PRESIDENT FERRY:

Are there other questions Senator Cornaby?

SENATOR BLACK:

It does not.

Only this, Kr. President, was there any

amendments made in your Committee?

-2-

1

SENATOR CORNABY:

No amendments made in the Standing Commit'<

2

PRESIDENT FERRY:

Senator Wayment,

3

SENATOR SHERMAN WAYMENT:

Senator Cornaby could you just gi,

4

a little more rational of why you think it's important that just tho<.

5

injured who now have light duties or could come back to work under

6

duty conditions now or if work is not available to them that they '"

7

given full benefits for up to eight years?

8

SENATOR CORNABY:

i:,

It is not an eight year period, Senator

9

Wayment, what it is is that if a person cannot find work again at his

10

place of employment or elsewhere and is still under the doctor's care,

ll

compensation continues until the doctor releases him, and it is not t'•

12

not necessarily an eight year period.

lJ

14
15
16
17
18

19
20

SENATOR SHERMAN WAYMENT:
but is not fully recovered.
SENATOR CORNABY:

Is that .....
That's correct.

cannot find work in his field.
PRESIDENT FERRY:

But that person is partially recovr

And that applies only ifl•

Call for the question Hr. President.

Senator Corna by, it seems to be not too mu:·

discussion do you want to go further than just the ..... ?
SENATOR CORNABY:

Yes, if there doesn't seem to be any

questions, I suppose in view of the shortness of time ....

21

SENATOR BUNNELL:

Hr. President.

22

PRESIDENT FERRY:

Yes Senator.

SENATOR BUNNELL:

As you know because the industdal nature

23
24
25

my area. we are always very concerned with Workmen• s Compensation

r'

\le

feel like this bill is a very appropdate bill and I want to support'
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1
2
3

I
bill in every respect.

It is a good piece of legislation and we need it

on the books.
SENATOR CORNABY:

Kr. President under suspension of the rules, I

4

would move that we consider the bill as having been read for the second

5

and third time and up for final passage.

6

PRESIDENT FERRY:

The motion by Senator Cornaby that we suspend

rules and consider Senate Bill 187 as being read for the second and third
8

time and up for final passage.

9

of the motion say "aye".

10

CHAMBER:

11

PRESIDENT FERRY:

12

CHAMBER:

13

PRESIDENT FERRY:

Discussion on that motion, all in favor

Aye.
Opposed "no".

No.
Motion carried.

Now we will have a roll call

14

vote on Senate Bill number 187, under suspension of the rules third

15

reading calendar, the question is shall the bill pass.

16

DOCKET CLERK:

Asay.

DOCKET CLERK:

Asay.

20

DOCKET CLERK:

Bangerter.

21

SENATOR BANGERTER:

22

DOCKET CLERK:

23

SENATOR BARLOW:

24

DOCKET CLERK:

25

SENATOR BARTON:

17

18
19

Aye.

Barlow.
Aye.
Barton.
Aye.
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Roll call vote.

1

DOCKET CLERK:

Bennett.

3

DOCKET CLERK:

Black.

4

SENATOR BLACK:

Aye.

5

DOCKET CLERK:

Bullen.

7

DOCKET CLERK:

Bunnell.

8

SENATOR BUNNELL:

9

DOCKET CLERK:

2

6

Aye.

Carling.

10

SENATOR CARLING:

11

DOCKET CLERK:

12

SENATOR CHRISTENSEN:

13

DOCKET CLERK:

14

SENATOR CORNABY:

15

DOCKET CLERK:

16

SENATOR FARLEY:

17

DOCKET CLERK:

18

SENATOR FINLINSON:

19

DOCKET CLERK:

Flarmn.

21

DOCKET CLERK:

Halverson.

22

SENATOR HALVERSON:

23

DOCKET CLERK:

Jeffs.

24

SENATOR JEFFS:

Aye.

25

DOCKET CLERK:

Jones.

Aye.

Christensen.
Aye.

Cornaby.
Aye.

Farley.
Aye.
Finlinson.
Aye.

20
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Aye.

l

2

SENATOR JONES:

Pass.

DOCKET CLERK:

Kimball.

DOCKET CLERK:

Matheson.

3

4

5

6

8
9

SENATOR MATHESON:

Aye.

DOCKET CLERK:

Honey.

SENATOR HONEY:

Aye.

DOCKET CLERK:

Cary Peterson.

SENATOR PETERSON:

Aye.

10

DOCKET CLERK:

11

SENATOR PETERSON:

12

DOCKET CLERK:

Pugh.

13

SENATOR PUGH:

Aye.

14

DOCKET CLERK:

Sandberg.

16

DOCKET CLERK:

Snow.

17

SENATOR SNOW:

Aye.

18

DOCKET CLERK:

Sowards.

20

DOCKET CLERK:

swan.

21

SENATOR SWAN:

Aye.

22

DOCKET CLERK:

Wayment.

23

SENATOR WAYMENT:

24

DOCKET CLERK:

25

PRESIDENT FERRY:

Lowell Peterson.
Aye.

15

19

Aye.

Hr. President.
Aye.
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1

DOCKET CLERK:

Jones.

2

SENATOR JONES:

Aye.

3

PRESIDENT FERRY:

Senate 187 under suspension rules final

4

passage with total 21 ayes, 1 nay and 7 being absent receives the

5

constitutional majority, bill passes and referred to the House for

6

further action.

7

Senate Bill 209.

8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15

16
17

18

19
20

21
22

23
24

25
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